Teachable cases
I. Case
State v. Yoder
49 Wis. 2d 430 (1971)
and
Wisconsin v. Yoder
406 US 205, 32 L Ed 15, 92 S Ct 1526
Summary
In this case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court weighed the state's interest in educating children against the First Amendment guarantee of religious freedom.
The Court held that a state law requiring children to attend school full time was unconstitutional because it infringed on the freedom of the Amish to practice their religion, reversing a Green County Circuit Court decision. In reaching this decision, the Court distinguished itself from courts around the country that had upheld compulsory education. The majority opinion was authored by Chief Justice E. Harold Hallows. Justice Connor T. Hansen concurred and was joined by Justices Horace W. Wilkie, Bruce F. Beilfuss and Robert W. Hansen. Justice Nathan S. Heffernan dissented.
The case was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which affirmed the state Supreme Court's ruling in a 6-1 decision authored by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger. Justice William O. Douglas dissented in part from the majority. Justices William H. Rehnquist and Lewis F. Powell, Jr. did not take part in the case.
In this case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that Amish parents could remove their children from public schools after the 8th grade as an exercise of their right to religious freedom. The Amish separate themselves from modern society and provide their children with their own system of education structured in accord with their beliefs.
The appellants were the parents of three teenagers who had attended the New Glarus public schools. The parents were fined for refusing to enroll the children in the high school in the fall of 1968. This was in violation of the compulsory school law.* The respondent, the state of Wisconsin, argued that the state had a legitimate interest in compelling children to attend school and that this outweighed the interference with religious freedom.
In making its decision, the Court weighed the appellants' constitutional right to religious freedom** against the state's interest in compulsory education. In determining how heavy a burden the statute placed on the Amish, the Court considered the beliefs of the Amish religion. Justice Hallows wrote:
The period of adolescence is critical in the religious and cultural development of the child because at this time the child enters gradually into the fullness of Amish life, is given responsibilities which would be directly interfered with if he were compelled to go to high school . . To the Amish, secondary schools. . . teach an unacceptable value system . . . We view this case as involving solely a parent's right of religious freedom to bring up his children as he believes God dictates.
The Court then looked at whether the state's interest was compelling in this case. The state argued that some Amish children may choose to leave their community upon reaching adulthood; therefore, public school education would better prepare them for their futures. But forcing a "worldly" education on all Amish children, the Court determined, in order to benefit the few children who might later leave, did not constitute a compelling state interest.
Furthermore, while an individual is free to choose a religion as an adult, the Court ruled that parents have the right to choose which religion they will raise their children. The state, the Court declared, should not infringe on this right by enforcing educational requirements.
In closing, the Court articulated its belief in the importance of the guarantees of the First Amendment, including: free speech, freedom of the press and freedom of religion. Hallows wrote: "the right to worship your God or to practice your religious beliefs are as important as the right to speak or print freely and may, to the individual involved, be more important."
In Justice Heffernan's dissent, he asserted that the majority had misinterpreted the facts of the case. He wrote that the state did demonstrate a compelling interest and he pointed out that the appellants had alternatives to sending their children to public school. Other states had dealt with this issue and the Amish in those states established their own private schools to satisfy compulsory education requirements. Heffernan was particularly concerned about the rights of Amish children. He argued that under the majority opinion the state was not preparing Amish youth for "modern American life." He wrote:
On the basis of the religious beliefs of their parents, the Amish children are without a hearing consigned to a life of ignorance-blissful as it may seem to the author of the principal opinion, who apparently views the Amish as 'the noble savage,' uncorrupted by the world . . . No part of our law requires a student to go to a school not of his own religious choice. It merely requires that he go to a school.
The case was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. The U.S. Court affirmed the state Supreme Court, declaring that the state's interest in education is not exempt from a "balancing process" when dealing with fundamental rights. The U.S. Court agreed that the Amish demonstrated that continuing their children's education beyond the 8th grade would hinder the exercise of their religious beliefs.
* - Pertinent sections of Wis. Stat. sec. 118.15 are quoted in the Wisconsin Supreme Court decision: "(1) Unless the child has a legal excuse, any person having under his control a child between the ages of 7 and 16 years shall cause such child to attend school regularly, during the full period and hours, religious holidays excepted, that the public or private school in which such child should be enrolled is in session, to the end of the school term, quarter or semester of the school year in which he becomes 16 years of age."
** - U.S. Constitution, First Amendment: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . ."
II. Case
State v. Stevens
123 Wis. 2d 303 (1985)
Summary
In the 1980s and 1990s, many cases have come to the courts challenging the validity of a search or seizure under the federal and state constitutions. This is one such case. In this case, a divided Wisconsin Supreme Court determined that police may seize and search a person's garbage without a warrant, affirming in part and reversed in part a decision of the Court of Appeals. Justice Roland B. Day wrote the majority opinion and Chief Justice Nathan S. Heffernan wrote the dissent. The case originated in Milwaukee County Circuit Court.
In this case, the Supreme Court determined that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in curbside garbage. Under the facts of this case, the Court said this includes garbage obtained by a garbage collector who is working as a secret agent of the police and collects the garbage for the sole purpose of turning it over to authorities.
The defendant, David Stevens, was under investigation for suspected drug activities. A deputy from the Milwaukee County Sheriff's Department wanted to search Stevens' garbage for drug-related evidence. The deputy told the municipal garbage collector to bring Stevens' garbage to him after the next scheduled pickup.
On the day Stevens' trash is normally picked up, the garbage collector found the cans empty and knocked on Stevens' door to ask for his garbage. Stevens did not know that the collector was acting on behalf of the deputy. Stevens opened his garage door and let the collector take the four garbage bags from inside. The collector then gave them to the deputy to search.
The deputy found enough evidence in the garbage bags to obtain a search warrant for Stevens' home. Cocaine, marijuana, drug paraphernalia and money in the home led to Stevens' arrest. He was charged with possession of cocaine and marijuana with intent to deliver.
The defendant claimed that searching his garbage was unlawful and, therefore, the warrant to search his house (which was based on the evidence found in the garbage) was improperly given. The trial court, Court of Appeals and Supreme Court all disagreed.
The Supreme Court found that the seizure and search of the defendant's garbage did not violate his rights under the U.S. or Wisconsin Constitutions.* Justice Day wrote:
(B)ecause there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage that is removed by municipal garbage collectors in routine collection, the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage which was removed by the municipal collector pursuant to his consent.
Dissenting, Chief Justice Heffernan wrote:
It is difficult to believe that anyone would seriously contend that there is not a reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage against the prying eyes of government.Almost all the intimate details of one's personal life may be revealed by what is placed in the trash, including personal matters which would cover the gamut from how one's alimentary canal functions to the brand or quantity of liquor consumed in the household.
Furthermore, Heffernan wrote, people must dispose of garbage. Since they know that the purpose of garbage collection is destruction, it is reasonable, he wrote, that people have an expectation of privacy and an expectation that the garbage will be handled in the usual manner, without interception by state agents.
* - U. S. Constitution, Fourth Amendment and Wisconsin Constitution, Article 1, Section 11: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
III. Case
Wisconsin v. Mitchell
(92-515), 508 U.S. 47 (1993).
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
WISCONSIN v. MITCHELL
Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
No. 92-515. Argued April 21, 1993 -- Decided June 11, 1993
Summary
Pursuant to a Wisconsin statute, respondent Mitchell's sentence for aggravated battery was enhanced because he intentionally selected his victim on account of the victim's race. The State Court of Appeals rejected his challenge to the law's constitutionality, but the State Supreme Court reversed. Relying on R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U. S. ___, it held that the statute violates the First Amendment by punishing what the legislature has deemed to be offensive thought and rejected the State's contention that the law punishes only the conduct of intentional victim selection. It also found that the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad because the evidentiary use of a defendant's prior speech would have a chilling effect on those who fear they may be prosecuted for offenses subject to penalty enhancement. Finally, it distinguished antidiscrimination laws, which have long been held constitutional, on the ground that they prohibit objective acts of discrimination, whereas the state statute punishes the subjective mental process.
Held: Mitchell's First Amendment rights were not violated by the application of the penalty enhancement provision in sentencing him. Pp. 4-12.
(a) While Mitchell correctly notes that this Court is bound by a state court's interpretation of a state statute, the State Supreme Court did not construe the instant statute in the sense of defining the meaning of a particular word or phrase. Rather, it characterized the statute's practical effect for First Amendment purposes. Thus, after resolving any ambiguities in the statute's meaning, this Court may form its own judgment about the law's operative effect. The State's argument that the statute punishes only conduct does not dispose of Mitchell's claim, since the fact remains that the same criminal conduct is more heavily punished if the victim is selected because of his protected status than if no such motive obtains. Pp. 5-6.
(b) In determining what sentence to impose, sentencing judges have traditionally considered a wide variety of factors in addition to evidence bearing on guilt, including a defendant's motive for committing the offense. While it is equally true that a sentencing judge may not take into consideration a defendant's abstract beliefs, however obnoxious to most people, the Constitution does not erect a per se barrier to the admission of evidence concerning one's beliefs and associations at sentencing simply because they are protected by the First Amendment. Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U. S. ___; Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (plurality opinion). That Dawson and Barclay did not involve the application of a penalty enhancement provision does not make them inapposite. Barclay involved the consideration of racial animus in determining whether to sentence a defendant to death, the most severe "enhancement" of all; and the state legislature has the primary responsibility for fixing criminal penalties. Motive plays the same role under the state statute as it does under federal and state antidiscrimination laws, which have been upheld against constitutional challenge. Nothing in R. A. V. v. St. Paul, supra, compels a different result here. The ordinance at issue there was explicitly directed at speech, while the one here is aimed at conduct unprotected by the First Amendment. Moreover, the State's desire to redress what it sees as the greater individual and societal harm inflicted by bias inspired conduct provides an adequate explanation for the provision over and above mere disagreement with offenders' beliefs or biases. Pp. 7-10.
(c) Because the statute has no "chilling effect" on free speech, it is not unconstitutionally overbroad. The prospect of a citizen suppressing his bigoted beliefs for fear that evidence of those beliefs will be introduced against him at trial if he commits a serious offense against person or property is too speculative a hypothesis to support this claim. Moreover, the First Amendment permits the admission of previous declarations or statements to establish the elements of a crime or to prove motive or intent, subject to evidentiary rules dealing with relevancy, reliability, and the like. Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631 <http://supct.law.cornell.edu/cgi-bin/sup-choice.cgi?330+631>. Pp. 10-12.
169 Wis. 2d 153, 485 N. W. 2d 807, reversed and remanded.
Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
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